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Abstract
Agents are farsighted when they consider the ultimate consequences of their actions.
We re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete infor-
mation in a setting with transfers, where farsighted coalitions are considered funda-
mental behavioral units, and the equilibrium outcomes of their interactions are pre-
dicted via the stability notion of the largest consistent set. The designers exercise
consists of designing a rights structure that formalizes the idea of power distribution
in society. The designers challenge lies in forming a rights structure in which the equi-
librium behavior of agents always coincides with the recommendation given by a social
choice rule. We show that (Maskin) monotonicity fully identies the class of imple-
mentable single-valued social choice rules. Even though, monotonicity is not necessary
for implementation in general, we show that every monotonic social choice rule can be
implemented. These ndings imply that the class of implementable social choice rules
in core equilibria is unaltered by farsighted reasoning.
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1 Introduction
The challenge of implementation lies in designing a mechanism (i.e., game form) in which
the equilibrium behavior of agents always coincides with the recommendation given by a
social choice rule (SCR). If such a mechanism exists, the SCR is implementable.
Thus, the key question is how to design an implementing mechanism so that its out-
comes can be predicted through the application of game theoretic solution concepts. Most
early studies of implementation focused on noncooperative solution concepts, such as the
Nash equilibrium and its renements. As demonstrated in the seminal paper by Koray and
Yildiz (2018), an alternative to the noncooperative approach is to allow groups of agents
to coordinate their behaviors in a mutually benecial manner. To move away from non-
cooperative modeling, the details of coalition formation are left unspecied. Consequently,
coalitionsnot individualsbecome the basic decision-making units. Here, the role of the
solution concept is to explain why, when, and which coalition forms and what it can achieve.
More importantly, the chosen coalitional solution concept is independent of the physical
structure under which coalition formation takes place (e.g., Chwe, 1994). This structure,
often dened by an e¤ectivity relationship, species which coalitions can form given a status
quo outcome, and what they can achieve when they form (i.e., what new status quo outcomes
they can induce). From an implementation viewpoint, the e¤ectivity relationship is the
design variable, playing the role of the mechanism.
Koray and Yildiz (2018) formalize this idea and study its implications. In their frame-
work, the implementation of an SCR is achieved by designing a generalization of the e¤ec-
tivity relationship, introduced by Sertel (2001), called a rights structure.1 A rights structure
  consists of a state space S, an outcome function h that associates every state with an
outcome, and a code of rights . A code of rights species, for each pair of states (s; t), a
collection of coalitions (s; t) that are e¤ective at moving from s to t. The rights structure
is more exible than the e¤ectivity function, as it allows the strategic options of coalitions
to depend on how the status quo outcome is reached (i.e., on the current state).
As a coalitional solution, Koray and Yildiz (2018) adopt a version of the core.2 State
t directly dominates state s if a coalition K exists that is e¤ective at moving from s to t,
and each member of K receives a larger payo¤ under t than they receive under s. State s is
a core state under a given rights structure and agents preferences if no state that directly
dominates it exists.
1McQuillin and Sugden (2011) propose a similar notion, named the game in transition function form, as
a generalization of e¤ectivity functions.
2Korpela et al. (2020) study the implementation in core by a rights structure   = (S; h; ), where S is
the set of outcomes and h is the identity map.
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This classical solution is based on a myopic notion of dominance, which creates inevitable
problems. Ray and Vohra (2015) illustrate this point clearly in the following example using
two agents and three states. Suppose that only agent 1 is e¤ective in moving from s to t,
i.e., s !f1g t, and only agent 2 is e¤ective in moving from t to s0, i.e., t !f2g s0. Figure 1
depicts this example, where the payo¤s to the agents in each of the states are in parentheses.
s t sf1g f2gu u u- -
(1,1) (0,0) (10,10)
Figure 1.
The core consists of states s and s0. Although agent 1 has the power to move from s to
t, agent 1 has no incentive to do so: t does not directly dominate s. However, the stability
of s is based on myopic reasoning. If agent 1 was farsighted, the agent should move to t
because agent 2 (who is rational) will in turn move to s0. Thus, farsighted agents do not
necessarily move because they have a direct objection but because their moves can trigger
further changes, eventually leading to a better outcome. Clearly, the classic notion of core
does not incorporate any farsightedness.
To address this gap, two questions must be answered. Where does the objection process
lead? Can we be sure that the end state of the process creates an e¤ective deterrence
for the deviating coalition? These questions, which form the scope of an expanding body
of literature on farsighted coalition formation, do not have a clear answer in the current
context.3 However, as noted by Koray and Yildiz (2018), the notion of equilibrium by these
authors is shortsighted.
Harsanyi (1974), in his critique of the vNM stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1947), suggests replacing the notion of direct dominance with indirect dominance. In
dening his largest consistent set (LCS), Chwe (1994) formalizes a version of Harsanyis
indirect dominance. State t indirectly dominates s if t can replace s via a sequence of moves
such that, at each move, the e¤ective moving coalition prefers the outcome associated with
t (the nal state) to the outcome it would obtain if it decided not to move (for a formal
denition, see Denition 3). Figure 1 shows that s0 indirectly dominates s. This is so because
agent 1 can move from s to t, and agent 1s payo¤ at s0 is larger than the payo¤ at t, and
agent 2 can move from t to s0. Additionally, agent 2s payo¤ at s0 is larger than the payo¤
at t. Thus, indirect dominance captures the fact that farsighted agents consider the nal
states to which their moves may lead.
3See, for example, Chwe (1994), Vartiainen (2011), Vohra and Ray (2019), and Dutta and Vohra (2017).
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Based on this notion of indirect dominance, Chwe (1994) suggests a new concept of
stability, namely, the largest consistent set (LCS), which has the advantages of ruling out
with condence and being non-empty under weak conditions.4 To check whether state s is
stable, suppose that coalition K deviates to state t. Further deviations from t may occur,
which end up at s0, where s0 indirectly dominates t. Alternatively, no further deviations
from t may occur, making t = s0 the nal state. In either case, the nal state, s0, should
itself be stable. If a member of the deviating coalition does not prefer s0 to the original
state, s, then the deviation is deterred. State s is stable if all deviations are deterred. Since
whether a state is stable depends on whether other stable states exist, a set of stable states
is called a consistent set. Although many consistent sets may exist, the LCS uniquely exists;
that is, a consistent set that includes all others. If state s is not contained in the LCS, the
interpretation is that s cannot be stable; there is no consistent story behind s.
For this reason, and given the lack of clear theoretical guidance as to which farsighted
stability solution to follow, we adopt the LCS as a coalitional solution. The implementation
problem consists of designing a rights structure,  , with the property that, for each prole of
agents preferences, the outcome associated with the LCS always coincides with the recom-
mendation of the given SCR. If such a rights structure exists, the SCR is LCS-implementable
by a rights structure.
We investigate the LCS-implementation of SCRs in environments with transfers in which
the initial state is exogenously given. There are important situations where the initial state
is naturally determined.5 For instance, the initial state is the no trade allocation in a
house allocation problem, no production in a Cournot oligopoly market, or when agents can
together produce one unit of output but no agent can independently produce any output,
and so on. We also assume that agents preferences are continuous and money monotonic
(following Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015).
Although (Maskin) monotonicity is generally not necessary for LCS-implementation via
4A growing body of literature studies farsighted stability in coalitional games, which includes Aumann
and Myerson (1988), Xue (1998), Diamantoudi and Xue (2003), Herings et al. (2004), Jordan (2006), Ray
(2007), Mauleon et al. (2011), Vartiainen (2011), Kimya (2015), Ray and Vohra (2015), Bloch and van den
Nouweland (2020), Dutta and Vohra (2017), Dutta and Vartiainen (2019), and Vohra and Ray (2019).
5In case in which the initial state is not naturally determined, the problem of convergence from unstable
states to stable states is particularly important. Indeed, Koray and Yildiz (2018) show that the convergence
to core equilibria can be assured by imposing an external myopic stability property on the implementing
rights structure: each equilibrium state can be reached from any nonequilibrium state via a sequence of states
such that the passage from each state in the sequence to the next one is justied both rights-and preference-
wise. In this paper, rather than imposing an external stability property, we study implementation problems
in which the initial state is naturally determined and the task of the designer is in some sense easier because
we ask him to devise a rights structure in which any stable state can be reached from the initial state.
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rights structures, we show that it is su¢cient. This result is obtained by designing a rights
structure satisfying the following convergence property: Every stable state directly dominates
the initial state. Therefore, we establish a direct convergence from the initial (unstable) state
to the stable states, which is particularly important in our design framework. This result
relies on the domain assumption that each agent considers the outcome corresponding to the
initial state to be worse than any outcome in the range of the SCR. For example, in a house
allocation problem, this would be satised by requiring traders to be (discernibly) strictly
better o¤ when they trade.
This is surprising because monotonicity, in the sense of Maskin (1999), is at the heart
of the characterization results of Koray and Yildiz (2018). Korpela et al. (2020) show that
monotonicity fully characterizes the class of implementable SCRs via a rights structure in a
setting with transfers in which agents have money monotonic and continuous preferences.6
Thus, the desire to design rights structures that are immune to farsighted behavior leaves
the class of SCRs that are implementable in core equilibria unchanged.7
Finally, we also show that monotonicity fully characterizes the class of LCS-implementable
social choice functions (SCFs)an SCF is a single-valued SCR. This result is both inter-
esting per se and also useful in providing a full characterization of various renements and
modications to which the denition of LCS has led (for further discussion see subsection
3.2). Indeed, although there is no clear theoretical guidance as to which farsighted stabil-
ity solution to follow, it is well accepted in the literature on coalition formation that any
farsighted solution concept needs to pass the minimal test of the LCS (see, e.g., Dutta and
Vartiainen, 2020).
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 sets out the theoretical
framework and outlines the basic model. Section 3 provides our characterization results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
We consider an environment with transfers, which consists of a collection of n agents (we
write N for the set of agents), a set of possible types , and a (nonempty) set of outcomes
Z  D Rn. D is the set of potential social decisions, with d 2 D as a typical element. Rn
is the set of transfers to the agents, with t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 R
n as a typical transfer prole. For
notational simplicity, sometimes we write d for outcome (d; 0; :::; 0) 2 Z. For any agent is
6More precisely, Korpela et al (2020) show that monotinicity, when combined with unanimity, is necessary
and su¢cient for implementation by rights structures.
7The rights structure devised in Theorem 1 also implements F in core equilibria.
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transfer ti, (0 i; ti) denotes a transfer prole that assigns ti to agent i and zero to everyone
else.
In this environment, there is an initial outcome  2 Z, which is exogenously given. As
discussed in the introduction, there are important economic situations in which the initial
state is naturally determined, and it cannot be chosen by the designer. For instance, the
initial state is the no trade allocation in a house allocation problem.
Agent is preferences are represented by a utility function: ui : Z   ! R. ui (x; ) is
agent is utility at type  when the outcome is x. Given type  and outcome x, let agent is
lower contour set of ui (; ) at x be dened by Li (x; )  fy 2 Zjui (x; )  ui (y; )g, and
agent is strict lower contour set of ui (; ) at x be dened by SLi (x; ) = fy 2 Zjui (x; ) >
ui (y; )g.
Fix any i 2 N , any ; 0 2  and any x 2 Z. We say that 0 is a monotonic transformation
of  at x for agent i if Li(x; )  Li(x; 
0). If 0 is a monotonic transformation of  at x for
each agent i 2 N , we say that 0 is a monotonic transformation of  at x.
For each agent i 2 N , agent is utility function ui : Z ! R is assumed to satisfy the
following properties.
Denition 1 Agent is utility function ui : Z   ! R is money monotonic provided
that for each  2 , each d 2 D, each t i 2 R
n 1 and each ti; t
0
i 2 R, if ti < t
0
i, then
ui (d; (t i; t
0
i) ; ) > ui (d; (t i; ti) ; ).
Denition 2 Agent is utility function ui : Z   ! R is continuous provided that for
each  2  and each x 2 Z, the sets Li (x; ) and Ui (x; ) are closed, where Ui (x; ) =
fy 2 Zjui (y; )  ui (x; )g.
We focus on complete information environments in which the true type is common knowl-
edge among agents but unknown to the designer. The power set of N is denoted by N , and
N0  N   f?g is the set of all nonempty subsets of N . Each group of agents, K (in N0), is
a coalition.
The goal of the designer is to implement a social choice rule (SCR) F :  ! Z dened
by ? 6= F ()  Z for every  2 . We refer to x 2 F () as the F -optimal outcome at . F
is said to be a social choice function (SCF) if F () 2 Z for every  2 .
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The initial outcome  2 Z is such that for all  2 , ui (x; ) > ui (; ) for
all i 2 N and all x 2 F ().
Assumption 1 is a requirement that  is such that each agent considers it to be worse
than any F -optimal outcome at . For example, in a house allocation problem, this would
be satised by requiring all agents to gain from trade (at each state).
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To implement his goal, the designer devises rights structure  , which is a triplet, (S; h; ),
where:
 S is the state space;
 h : S ! Z is the outcome function; and
  is a code of rights, which is a (possibly empty) correspondence  : S  S  N .
Code of rights  species, for each pair of states (s; t), a family of coalitions  (s; t)
entitled to approve a change from state s to t.
To capture farsightedness, Chwe (1994) formalizes the following notion of indirect dom-
inance relationa notion informally introduced by Harsanyi (1974) in his criticism of the
vNM stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947), which is based on direct domi-
nance. For all  2  and K 2 N0, let x u

K y denote ui (x; ) > ui (y; ) for all i 2 K.
Denition 3 A state s is indirectly dominated by s0 at ( ; ), or s0 ( ;) s, if there exist
s0; s1; :::; sJ in S (where s0 = s and sJ = s
0) and K0; K1; :::; KJ 1 in N0 such that Kj 1 2
 (sj 1; sj) and h (s
0) uKj 1 h (sj 1) for j = 1; :::; J . A state s is directly dominated by s
0 at
( ; ) if J = 1.
Based on this indirect dominance, the LCS of Chwe (1994) can be dened as follows.8
Denition 4 (Chwe, 1994) For any   and any  2 , a set T  S is a consistent set at
( ; ) if s 2 T if and only if for all t 2 S and all K 2 N0 such that K 2  (s; t), there exists
s0 2 T , where s0 = t or s0 ( ;) t, such that not h (s0) uK h (s). The LCS at ( ; ), denoted
by LCS ( ; ), is the unique maximal consistent set at ( ; ) with respect to set inclusion.
We refer to s 2 LCS ( ; ) as a stable state (at ( ; )).
The LCS is (internally) consistent in the sense that a deviation by coalition K from state
s in the LCS to state t is deterred, if subsequent deviations by other coalitions from t could
lead to a state s0 in the LCS which indirectly dominates t and at which not all members of
K are strictly better o¤ with respect to s. Moreover, the LCS is (externally) consistent in
the sense that a defection from a state outside the LCS cannot be deterred. When the set
of states S is nite or countably innite, the LCS is also externally stable in the sense that
every state not in the LCS is indirectly dominated by another state in the LCS (Chwe, 1994;
8Given a game, ( ; ), where   is such that S is the set of outcomes and h is the identity map, Chwe shows
that if S is countable and contains no innite sequence s1; s2; ::: such that j > i implies that sj 
( ;) si,
then LCS ( ; ) is nonempty. This result has been extended by Xue (1997) by removing the countability
requirement.
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Proposition 2). In the context of stability, Chwes interpretation of indirect dominance is
that if s0 ( ;) t and s0 is presumed to be stable, then it is possible, not certain, that the
coalitions K0; :::; KJ 1 will move from t to s
0.
Our notion of implementation can be stated as follows.
Denition 5 A rights structure   implements F in the LCS, or simply LCS-implements F ,
if F () = h  LCS ( ; ) for all  2 , where h  LCS ( ; ) = fh (s) js 2 LCS ( ; )g. If
such a   exists, then F is LCS-implementable by a rights structure.
3 Characterization results
A well-known condition in implementation theory is (Maskin) monotonicity (Maskin, 1999).
This condition states that if x is an F -optimal outcome at , and 0 is a monotonic trans-
formation of  at x, then x must be an F -optimal outcome at 0. Formally:
Denition 6 F is monotonic provided that for all ; 0 2 , if x 2 F () and
Li(x; )  Li(x; 
0) for all i 2 N ,
then x 2 F (0).
Remark 1 Observe that since the agents preferences are continuous and money monotonic,
we have
SLi(x; )  SLi(x; 
0) () Li(x; )  Li(x; 
0),
for all ; 0 2 , all x 2 Z and all i 2 N .
Monotonicity is not, in general, necessary for LCS-implementation by a rights structure.
The reason is that monotonicity is a condition formulated for Nash implementation. In
contrast to the denition of consistent set, which is a setwise denition, the denition of
Nash equilibrium is based on a pointwise denition. To illustrate this, we construct a non-
monotonic SCR that is LCS-implementable in a quasilinear environment. An environment
 is quasilinear when for each  2 , each i 2 N , and each (d; t) 2 Z, agent is utility
ui ((d; t) ; ) = vi (d; ) + ti
is linear in ti.
Example 1 Let  = f; 0g be a quasilinear environment. Suppose that n = 2 and that
D = fv; w; x; y; z; g. Agents rankings of the outcomes in D are represented in the table
below:
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v1 (; ) = v1 (; 
0) v2 (; ) v2 (; 
0)
v 2 1 3
w 0 3 2
z 4 4 4
y 3 2 1
x 1 -2 0
 -4 -4 -4
Suppose that ui

d; ^

= vi

d; ^

for all d 2 D, all ^ 2 , and all i 2 N . Dene F on  by
F () = fv; w; x; zg and F (0) = fv; zg. Note that Assumption 1 is satised because for all
^ 2 , ui

d; ^

> ui

; ^

for all i 2 N and all d 2 F

^

.
To see that F is not monotonic, assume, to the contrary, that it is monotonic. Since x 2
F () nF (0), monotonicity implies that there exists agent i and outcome (d; t) such that
vi (x; )  vi (d; ) + ti
and
vi (d; 
0) + ti > vi (x; 
0) .
By construction, it must be that agent i coincides with agent 2. Combining these two
inequalities and simplifying produces
v2 (x; )  v2 (x; 
0) > v2 (d; )  v2 (d; 
0) .
However, by construction, it holds that
v2 (x; )  v2 (x; 
0)  v2 (d
0; )  v2 (d
0; 0)
for all d0 2 D, which is a contradiction. Thus, F is not monotonic.
However, F is LCS-implementable by a rights structure. To see this, let us consider the
following rights structure   = (S; h; ) where the state space is S = D, the outcome function
h is the identity map, and the code of rights  : S  S  N is dened as follows:
 (; x) =  (x; y) = f1g and  (y; z) =  (y; w) =  (w; v) = f2g ,
and empty in all other cases. Figure 2 below gives a graphical illustration of the implementing
rights structure.
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Figure 2.
We can now check that LCS ( ; ) = F () = fv; w; x; zg and LCS ( ; 0) = F (0) = fv; zg.
Note that states v and z are stable since no coalition can deviate from these states, regardless
of type.
Let us rst consider type . State w is stable since agent 2 does not benet from deviating
to stable state v. State y is not stable since it is dominated both by stable state z and by
stable state wy cannot be dominated by v because v does not dominate w. State x is
stable since agent 1s deviation to y is deterred by the further deviation of agent 2 to stable
state w.  cannot be stable since it is dominated by x, z and wit cannot be dominated by
v because v does not dominate w. We conclude that LCS ( ; ) = fv; w; x; zg.
Next, let us consider type 0. In this case, given that every outcome in Dn fv; zg is indirectly
dominated by both z and v, we conclude that LCS ( ; 0) = fv; zg.
3.1 Monotonicity is su¢cient for LCS-implementation of SCRs
Though monotonicity is not, in general, a necessary condition, we show that it is su¢cient
for LCS-implementation of SCRs. This is an interesting result. The reason is that the
implementation of SCRs in core equilibria by a rights structure can be made robust to
farsighted reasoning. This is because monotonicity fully characterizes the class of SCRs that
are implementable in core equilibria via rights structure in a setting with transfers in which
agents have money monotonic and continuous preferences (Koray and Yildiz, 2018; Korpela
et al., 2020) and in our implementing rights structure the set of core equilibria coincides
with the LCS at each state. Thus, the desire to design rights structures that are immune
to farsighted behavior leaves the class of SCRs that are implementable in core equilibria
unchanged.
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Figure 3. An illustration of the implementing rights structure.
Let us give an intuitive explanation of the implementing rights structure  , which is
shown in Figure 3.
Recall that  is the initial outcome, which is exogenously given. For this reason, we set
 as the origin of our "star graph." The outcome function h maps  into itself. The code of
rights, , simply allows only grand coalition N to move away from  to pairs of type (; x)
with x 2 F (), and from pairs of type (; x) back to . Put di¤erently, only the grand
coalition can move from  to a point of the graph of F , i.e., f(; x) 2  Zjx 2 F ()g, and
from any point of this set back to . The outcome function h maps point (; x) of the graph
of F into outcome x.
An important property of the designed rights structure is that no coalition has the power
to directly move from a point of the graph of F to another point of the graph. However, any
two points of the graph of F are connected via state . For instance, suppose that state (; x)
is reached. State (0; x0) can be reached indirectly by passing through  because the rights
structure  allows grand coalition N to move from (; x) to  and from  to (0; x0)see
Figure 3.
Let us consider state (; x). Suppose that outcome (d; t) is in agent is strict lower contour
set of ui (; ) at x. Given that ui (x; ) > ui ((d; t) ; ) and that ui is continuous, there exists
an arbitrarily small transfer t^i such that
ui (x; ) > ui
  
d; t+
 
0 i; t^i

; 

> ui ((d; t) ; ) .
These inequalities allow us to construct an innite sequence of states s0; s1; :::; sk; ::: such
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that the outcome function h maps each state sk into
 
d; t+
 
0 i;
k
k+1
t^i

. This implies that
agent is payo¤ at state sk is ui
  
d; ti +
k
k+1
t^i

; 

.9 By money monotonicity, the sequence
s0; s1; :::; sk; ::: is a strictly increasing sequence of payo¤s for agent i, regardless of the true
type. This is an important feature because it allows us to design code of rights  in a way
that no state of type sk is stable.
Indeed, the devised code of rights  allows only agent i to move from sk to sk+1, for
k = 0; 1; 2; :::, from (; x) to s0 and from s0 back to (; x), and it does not allows any
coalition to move from sk+1 to sk, for k = 0; 1; 2; :::see Figure 3.
Since agent i has the incentive and power to move the state from sk to sk+1, for k =
0; 1; 2; :::, it follows that no state of type sk, for k = 0; 1; 2; :::, is stable. That is, no state
of the sequence s0; s1; :::; sk; ::: can be part of the LCS, irrespective of the true type. This
construction is repeated for any outcome in agent is strict lower contour set of ui (; ) at x,
for any agent i and any state (; x) in the graph of F .
Let us now briey discuss why the rights structure illustrated in Figure 3 LCS-implements
F .
Suppose that  is the true type. Our objective is to show that F () = h  LCS ( ; ).
The LCS of the game ( ; ) is not empty because the set f(; x)g is a consistent set of
( ; ). Indeed, if the grand coalition moves from (; x) to , the grand coalition has both the
power and incentive to go back to (; x), by Assumption 1. Moreover, if agent i moves from
(; x) to s0, agent i has both the power and incentive to go back to state (; x). Since this
reasoning holds for any state of type s0, it follows that f(; x)g is a consistent set of ( ; ).
This shows that f(; x) jx 2 F ()g is contained in LCS ( ; ), and so F ()  hLCS ( ; ).
For the converse, note that no state of type sk, for k = 0; 1; 2; :::, can belong to LCS ( ; )
as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the reason for this is that agent i has both the
incentive and power to follow the increasing sequence of payo¤s generated by sk+1; sk+2; :::.
Moreover, the initial state, , cannot belong to LCS ( ; ) either. To see this, suppose
that  2 LCS ( ; ). Since the grand coalition has the power to move from  to (; x),
this move must be deterred, in the sense that the move must lead, possibly via indirect
dominance, to state s 2 LCS ( ; ) such that either s = (; x) or s indirectly dominates
(; x), and at which not all members of N are strictly better o¤ with respect to .
By Assumption 1, s is di¤erent from (; x), otherwise, everyone is strictly better o¤ with
respect to , which is a contradiction. Moreover, by Assumption 1, s is di¤erent from ,
otherwise, s cannot indirectly dominate (; x). It follows that s =2 f(; x) ; g, and so it is a
point of the graph of F with s 6= (; x).
By construction, as we have discussed above, states (; x) and s are connected only via
9Note that for k = 0, ui (s0; ) = ui ((d; ti) ; ).
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, and only the grand coalition has the power to move state from (; x) to . Therefore,
the fact that s indirectly dominates (; x) implies that every agent needs to strictly prefer
h (s) to h (; x). In addition, since everyone also strictly prefers h (; x) to , by Assumption
1, it follows from transitivity of preferences that everyone strictly prefers h (s) to , which
contradicts the fact that the move from  to (; x) should be deterred.
From the preceding discussion, we have that LCS ( ; ) is contained in the graph of F ,
that is, in the set f(0; x0) 2  Zjx0 2 F (0)g. To establish that h  LCS ( ; )  F (),
we will be using the assumption that F is monotonic.
Take any (0; x0) 2 LCS ( ; ). Suppose that x0 =2 F (). Monotonicity, in combination
with Remark 1, implies that there exists an agent i that experiences a preference reversal of
the form ui (x
0; 0) > ui (y; 
0) and ui (y; )  ui (x
0; ). Since y is an element of agent is strict
lower contour set of ui (; 
0) at x0, it follows that there exists a state s00 such that agent i has
the power to move the state from (0; x0) to s00, where h (s
0
0) = y, and from s
0
0 back to (
0; x0),
by construction. Since (0; x0) 2 LCS ( ; ), the move from (0; x0) to s00 must be deterred,
in the sense that a deviation of agent i to s00 should lead, via indirect dominance, to another
state t 2 LCS ( ; ) in which agent i does not strictly prefer h (t) to h (0; x0), according to
his ranking at .10 However, by construction of the rights structure, the fact that t indirectly
dominates s00 means that the sequence of states and the sequence of coalitions leading to t
are such that the grand coalition moves from (0; x0) to  and everyone strictly prefers h (t)
to h (0; x0), which contradicts the fact that the move from (0; x0) should be deterred.
The result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1 Let Assumption 1 hold. If F is monotonic, then F is LCS-implementable by a
rights structure.
Proof. Suppose that F is monotonic. We now construct the implementing rights structure
  = (S; h; ). Fix any  2 . State space S is
S = f(; x) jx 2 F ()g [ T ,
where T  is dened by
T  = f((d; t) ; x; ; i; k) j (d; t) 2 SLi (x; ) for i 2 N , k 2 Z+ and x 2 F ()g , (1)
where Z+ denotes the set of non-negative integers. The outcome corresponding to (; x) is
x. To dene the outcome corresponding to state ((d; t) ; x; ; i; k), we x an arbitrarily small
transfer t^i such that
ui (x; ) > ui
 
(d; t) +
 
0 i; t^i

; 

> ui ((d; t) ; ) . (2)
10Note that t 6= s00 since LCS ( ; ) is contained in the graph of F .
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This transfer exists because ui is continuous. The outcome corresponding to ((d; t) ; x; ; i; k)
is h ((d; t) ; ; i; k) =
 
d; t+
 
0 i;
k
k+1
t^i

, so that agent is outcome is
 
d; ti +
k
k+1
t^i

. This
denition is important because it rules out state ((d; t) ; x; ; i; k) as a stable state, irrespective
of the true type. To see this, let us rst dene code of rights  as follows:
(1) For all (y; x; ; i; 0) ; (; x) 2 S,  ((; x) ; (y; x; ; i; 0)) =  ((y; x; ; i; 0) ; (; x)) = fig.
(2) For all (y; x; ; i; k) ; (y; x; ; i; k + 1) 2 T ,  ((y; x; ; i; k) ; (y; x; ; i; k + 1)) = fig.
(3) Otherwise, it is empty.
Let x 2 F () and (d; t) 2 SLi (x; ). We allow only agent i to be e¤ective in moving from
(; x) to ((d; t) ; x; ; i; 0), from ((d; t) ; x; ; i; 0) back to (; x), and from ((d; t) ; x; ; i; k) to
((d; t) ; x; ; i; k + 1). In all other cases, no coalition is e¤ective. To see that no state of the
form ((d; t) ; x; ; i; k) can be a stable state, it su¢ces to observe that the money monotonicity
of agent is utility function assures that
ui

d; ti +
k + 1
k + 2
t^i; 
0

> ui

d; ti +
k
k + 1
t^i; 
0

for every non-negative integer k  0 and every type 0 2 , so that agent i always has the
power as well as incentive to move from ((d; t) ; x; ; i; k) to ((d; t) ; x; ; i; k + 1).
Let us dene rights structure   = (S; h; ) as follows. We dene state space S by
S = [2S
 [ fg .
We dene outcome function h : S ! Z by h (s) = h (s) for all s 2 S and all  2 , and
h () = . Dene the code of rights  : S  S  N as follows. For all s; s0 2 S,
(A) If s; s0 2 S for some  2 , then  (s; s0) =  (s; s0).
(B) For all  2 , if s =  and s0 = , then  (; ) =  (; ) = N .
(C) Otherwise,  (s; s0) is empty.
Let us show that   LCS-implements F . Suppose that  is the true type.
Let us rst show that f(; x) jx 2 F ()g  LCS ( ; ). Fix any (; x). Let us show that
it is a consistent set. By denition of , there are only two possible ways to move away from
(; x).
First, suppose that N moves to . Since N 2  (; (; x)), by the denition of , and
since ui (x; ) > ui (; ) for all i 2 N , by Assumption 1, it follows that coalition N has the
incentive as well as power to go back to (; x).
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Second, suppose that agent i moves from (; x) to (y; x; ; i; 0). Since y 2 SLi(x; ), by
construction of T , agent i has the incentive as well as power to go back to (; x)note that
fig =  ((y; x; ; i; 0) ; ) by construction.
Since the choice of (y; x; ; i; 0) is arbitrary, it follows that f(; x)g is a consistent set
of ( ; ). Since the choice of x 2 F () is arbitrary, it follows that f(; x) jx 2 F ()g 
LCS ( ; ).
Next, let us show that hLCS ( ; )  F (). We already know that f(; x) jx 2 F ()g 
LCS ( ; ). Moreover, for the reasoning explained above, we also know that no state t 2
[2T
 can be a stable state at ( ; ). Consequently, it follows that
LCS ( ; ) 
 
; x

j 2  and x 2 F
 

	
[ fg .
Let us show that  =2 LCS ( ; ). Assume, on the contrary, that  2 LCS ( ; ). Take
any (; x). Since N 2  (; (; x)), by construction, it follows from the denition of the LCS
that there exists s 2 LCS ( ; ), where s = (; x) or s ( ;) (; x), such that not h (s) uN
h ().
An immediate contradiction of Assumption 1 is obtained if s = (; x). Thus, let us
consider the case s ( ;) (; x). Again, an immediate contradiction of Assumption 1 is
obtained if s = . Thus, let s 2
 
; x

j 2  and x 2 F
 

	
be such that s 6= (; x). By
the denition of  and the fact that s ( ;) (; x), it holds that the sequence of states of
s ( ;) (; x) is such that sj 1 = (; x) and sj =  for some j = 1; :::; J , that h (s) u

N
x, and that N 2  ((; x) ; ). Since x uN h (), by Assumption 1, and since h (s) u

N x,
it follows by transitivity of preferences that h (s) uN h (), which is a contradiction. Thus,
 =2 LCS ( ; ), and so LCS ( ; ) 
 
; x

j 2  and x 2 F
 

	
.
Finally, take any (0; x) 2 LCS ( ; ). Then, by denition, x 2 F (0). Let us show
that x 2 F (). Assume, to the contrary, that x =2 F (). Since F is monotonic, it fol-
lows that there exist i 2 N and y 2 SLi(x; 
0) such that ui (y; )  ui (x; ) by follow-
ing Remark 1. Then, (y; x; 0; i; 0) 2 T 
0
, by denition of T 
0
given in (1). Note that
fig =  ((0; x) ; (y; x; 0; i; 0)), by denition of . Since (0; x) 2 LCS ( ; ), there exists
s 2 LCS ( ; ) 
 
; x

j 2  and x 2 F
 

	
, where s ( ;) (y; x; 0; i; 0), such that
not h (s) ui x. Note that s 6= (
0; x) since only agent i can move away from (y; x; 0; i; 0)
and ui (y; )  ui (x; ). By the denition of indirect dominance, it follows that there exist
s0; s1; :::; sJ in S (where s0 = (y; x; 
0; i; 0) and sJ = s) and K0; K1; :::; KJ 1 in N0 such that
Kj 1 2  (sj 1; sj) and h (s) u

Kj 1
h (sj 1) for j = 1; :::; J . By the denition of , it follows
that for some j = 1; :::; J , Kj 1 = N , sj 1 = (
0; x) and sj = . This means that h (s)
uN x, which contradicts the fact that not h (s) u

i x. We conclude that x 2 F (), and so
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h  LCS ( ; )  F ().
We are left to show that the rights structure designed in the proof of Theorem 1 also
implements in core equilibria. To this end, we need some additional notation. For any rights
structure   and any  2 , a state s 2 S is a core equilibrium at  if, for no t 2 S, so that
h (s) 6= h (t) and no K 2  (s; t) is h (t) uK h (s). We express C ( ; R) for the set of core
equilibria at .
Denition 7 A rights structure   implements F in core-equilibria, or simply core-implements
F , if and only if F () = h  C ( ; ) for all  2 . If such a rights structure exists, F is
core-implementable by a rights structure.
Theorem 2 Let Assumption 1 hold. If F is monotonic, then F is LCS-implementable and
core-implementable by the same rights structure.
Proof. Let the premises hold. Let us consider the rights structure   designed in the proof
of Theorem 1. By this theorem, we already know that   LCS-implements F . Let us show
that F () = h  C ( ; ) for all  2 . Suppose that  is the true type.
Taking any x 2 F (), we show that x 2 h  C ( ; ). Since x 2 F (), we have that
(; x) 2 S. By construction, N has the power to move the state from (; x) to  but no
agent has incentive to do so, by Assumption 1. Fix any i 2 N and any ((d; t) ; x; ; i; 0) 2 T .
By denition, (d; t) 2 SLi (x; ), and so agent i does not have any incentive to move from
(; x) to ((d; t) ; x; ; i; 0). Since these are the only two ways that agents can move away from
(; x), by construction, it follows that (; x) 2 C ( ; ).
Next, let us show h  C ( ; )  F (). Observe that for the same reasoning given in the
proof of Theorem 1, no state t 2 [2T
 can be a core equilibrium at ( ; ). Consequently,
it follows that
C ( ; ) 
 
; x

j 2  and x 2 F
 

	
[ fg .
Let us show that  =2 C ( ; ). Assume, on the contrary, that  2 C ( ; ). Take any
(; x). Since N 2  (; (; x)), by construction, and since Assumption 1 holds, it follows that
 =2 C ( ; ), which is a contradition. Thus, C ( ; ) 
 
; x

j 2  and x 2 F
 

	
.
Take any (0; x) 2 C ( ; ), so that x 2 F (0). Assume, to the contrary, that x =2 F ().
Monotonicity implies that there exist i and y 2 Li (x; 
0) such that ui (y; ) > ui (x; ). Since
ui is continuous and money monotone it follows that there exists y
0 2 SLi (x; 
0) such that
ui (y
0; ) > ui (x; ). Since by construction of  it holds that i 2  ((x; 
0) ; y0), and since
ui (y
0; ) > ui (x; ), it follows that (x; 
0) =2 C ( ; ), which is a contradiction.
16
3.2 Monotonicity fully characterizes the class of LCS-implementable
SCFs
Our next result is that the class of LCS-implementable SCFs by a rights structure coincides
with the class of monotonic SCFs. This result has two main implications in the context of
our analysis.
First, comparing this result with the class of SCFs that are implementable in core equilib-
ria by a rights structure, we obtain that, in our environment, the class of LCS-implementable
SCFs coincides with the class of SCFs that are implementable in core equilibria. As already
mentioned, this is important because the desire to design rights structures that are robust
to farsighted behavior leaves the class of SCFs that can be implemented in core equilibria
unchanged.
Second, the LCS has led to various renements and modications, which are applied
in a variety of settings. For instance, the vNM FSS is derived from the classical vNM
solution by replacing direct dominance with indirect dominancesee Denition 3. Chwe
(1994) introduced the vNM FSS and showed that it is a renement of the LCS. Renements
and modications of the LCS and vNM FSS can be found in various studies on coalition
formation, such as Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004), Nagarajan and Soi´c (2007), Dutta
and Vohra (2017), and Dutta and Vartiainen (2020), and on network stability, such as Page
et al. (2005) and Herings et al. (2009). Although Konishi and Rays (2003) approach to
farsightedness is di¤erent from the reasoning leading to the LCS, one of the features of their
equilibrium (dynamic) process of coalition formation (EPCF) is that the set of all absorbing
states under all deterministic absorbing EPCFs is a proper renement of the LCS when the
discount factor is large enough. Soi´c (2006) and Nagarajan and Soi´c (2007) have used this
result in their analyses of various models of operations management. Since monotonicity fully
characterizes the class of LCS-implementable SCFs in our setup with transfers, monotonicity
is necessary and su¢cient for the implementation by rights structures of every renement of
the LCS provided that the renement is not empty whenever the LCS is not empty.
Theorem 3 Let Assumption 1 hold. An SCF F is monotonic if and only if F is LCS-
implementable by a rights structure.
Proof. Let the premises hold. The proof of the "only if" part follows from the proof of
Theorem 1. To complete the proof, we need to show that monotonicity is necessary for
LCS-implementation. To this end, suppose that   LCS-implements F . Fix any ; 0 2 .
Suppose that Li(F () ; )  Li(F () ; 
0) for all i 2 N . We show that F () = F (0).
By Remark 1, we have that SLi(F () ; )  SLi(F () ; 
0) for all i 2 N . By the LCS-
implementability of F , we have that h  LCS ( ; ) = F (). Therefore, there exists s 2
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LCS ( ; ) such that h (s) = F (). Let us rst show that the set LCS ( ; ) is a consistent
set at ( ; 0).
Fix any t 2 S and any s 2 LCS ( ; ) such that h (s) = F (). Nothing must be proved
if  (s; t) = ?. Then, suppose that K 2  (s; t) for some K 2 N0. Since LCS ( ; ) is a
consistent set at ( ; ), it follows that there exists s0 2 LCS ( ; ) such that either s0 = t
or s0 ( ;) t, and not h (s0) uK h (s). Note that h (s
0) = h (s) = F (). Then, we are done
if s0 = t. Suppose that s0 6= t. Thus, s0 ( ;) t. Since SLi(h (s
0) ; )  SLi(h (s
0) ; 0)
for all i 2 N , it follows that s0 ( ;
0) t. Since t 2 S, K 2 N0 and s 2 LCS ( ; ) have
been chosen arbitrarily, we have proved that LCS ( ; ) is a consistent set at ( ; 0). Since
LCS ( ; 0) is the LCS at ( ; 0) with respect to set inclusion and LCS ( ; ) is a consistent
set at ( ; 0), it follows that LCS ( ; )  LCS ( ; 0). Therefore, F () = F (0) by the
LCS-implementability of F . Thus, F is monotonic.
4 A necessary condition for SCRs
In this section, we introduce a new condition, called set-quasimonotonicity, which we show
to be necessary for the implementation of SCRs. Formally:
Denition 8 F is set-quasimonotonic provided that for all ; 0 2 , if
SLi(x; )  SLi(x; 
0) and Li (x; )
T
F ()  Li (x; 
0)
for all x 2 F () and all i 2 N , then F ()  F (0).
Set-quasimonotonicity coincides with monotonicity when F is an SCF. It requires that
if for each agent i, his or her strict lower contour set at each optimal outcome at  does
not shrink when the state changes from  to 0, as well as his or her set Li (x; )
T
F () at
each optimal outcome x 2 F () does not shrink, then the set F (0) of optimal outcomes at
0 is a superset of the set F () of optimal outcomes at . This condition is stronger than
the weak set monotonicity condition of Mezzetti and Renou (2012), which is a necessary
and almost su¢cient condition for implementation in mixed Nash equilibria. It is stronger
because weak set monotonicity requires that F ()  F (0) whenever for all x 2 F (), the
following two conditions are satised for every agent i 2 N : (i) SLi(x; )  SLi(x; 
0) and
(ii) Li (x; )  Li (x; 
0).
Theorem 4 If F is LCS-implementable by a rights structure, then it is set-quasimonotonic.
Proof. Suppose that   LCS-implements F . Take any ; 0 2 . Suppose that SLi(x; ) 
SLi(x; 
0) and Li (x; )
T
F ()  Li (x; 
0) for all x 2 h  LCS ( ; ) and all i 2 N . The
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statement follows if we show that LCS ( ; )  LCS ( ; 0). To this end, it su¢ces to show
that the set LCS ( ; ) is a consistent set of ( ; 0).
Take any s 2 LCS ( ; ). Fix any t 2 S. Nothing has to be proved if  (s; t) = ?.
Then, suppose that K 2  (s; t) for some K 2 N0. Since s 2 LCS ( ; ), there exists
s0 2 LCS ( ; ), where t = s0 or s0 ( ;) t, such that not h (s0) uK h (s).
Since not h (s0) uK h (s), it follows that ui (h (s) ; )  ui (h (s
0) ; ) for some i 2 K. Since
s0 2 LCS ( ; ), it follows that h (s0) 2 Li (h (s) ; )
T
h  LCS ( ; ). Since this intersection
is contained in Li (h (s) ; 
0), by our initial supposition, we have that not h (s0) u
0
K h (s). We
proceed according to whether s0 = t or not.
Suppose that s0 = t. Since not h (s0) u
0
K h (s), we have that there exists s
0 2 LCS ( ; )
such that not h (s0) u
0
K h (s).
Suppose that s0 6= t, and so s0 ( ;) t. Since SLi(h (s
0) ; )  SLi(h (s
0) ; 0) for all i 2 N ,
it follows that s0 ( ;
0) t. Thus, we established that there exists s0 2 LCS ( ; ), where
s0 ( ;
0) t, such that not h (s0) u
0
K h (s).
Since s 2 LCS ( ; ), t 2 S and K 2 N0 have been chosen arbitrarily, one can see that
LCS ( ; ) is a consistent set at ( ; 0). Thus, F is set-quasimonotonic.
Remark 2 Set-quasimonotonicity is a necessary condition for LCS-implementation in any
environment.
5 Conclusions
This paper extends the analysis of implementation through rights structures to farsighted
agents. We adopt Chwes (1994) LCS as the cooperative solution concept used to predict
the outcome of a rights structure. The study analyzes the implementation problems in a
setting with transfers in which there is a given, exogenous, initial state, and in which each
agent has a money monotonic and continuous preference. We show that any SCR is LCS-
implementable through rights structures if it is monotonic in the sense of Maskin (1999).
Monotonicity fully characterizes the class of LCS-implementable SCFs.
As a coalitional solution, Koray and Yildiz (2018) adopt a version of the core, which is
based on myopic reasoning: State s is an equilibrium state under a given rights structure
and agents preferences if no e¤ective coalition can guarantee each of its members a utility
level higher than the one they received under s. At the heart of their characterization result
is (Maskin) monotonicity. Korpela et al. (2020) show that monotonicity fully characterizes
the class of implementable SCRs in core equilibria via a rights structure in a setting with
transfers in which each agent has a money monotonic and continuous preference. Our results
imply that the class of SCRs that are implementable in core equilibria can be made immune
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to farsighted reasoning. We conjecture that this insight extends to other farsighted stability
solutions such as the farsighted stable set (Ray and Vohra, 2015).
Finally, let us remark that the full characterization of the class of SCRs that are LCS-
implementable by a rights structure is an important and di¢cult topic that is left for future
research. To this end, we have presented a necessary condition for LCS-implementation,
called set-quasimonotonicity, which is similar to the set-monotonicity condition of Mezzetti
and Renou (2012), which is a necessary and almost su¢cient condition for implementation
in mixed Nash equilibria.
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